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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA'S HOSPITAL
CERTIFICATE OF NEED PROGRAM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
MARK E. KALAN*
O NE of the social objectives near the top of many agendas is solv-
ing the growing health care crisis.' Among the goals most often
stated are containing the rising cost of health care, and ensuring that
everyone receives adequate health care, regardless of ability to pay. 2
During the 1970s and 1980s, the certificate of need program (CON)
gained widespread use as the primary regulatory tool to accomplish
these goals.3 This program basically requires that health care providers
receive government authorization before making major capital expen-
ditures or adding additional beds or services.4 Regulators believed
that, without CON, health care providers would not respond to ordi-
nary market forces and would overinvest in beds and services without
regard to actual need or demand.5
In light of mounting empirical evidence that CON has not accom-
plished its objectives,6 the federal government stopped requiring states
* The author is grateful to Professor Mark Seidenfeld for whose Regulation of Business
seminar an earlier version of this paper was prepared. His advice and comments helped to shape
many of the ideas expressed in this Comment. The author also thanks John French, a share-
holder of the Tallahassee firm Haben Culpepper Dunbar & French, P.A., for providing the
author with helpful background information. The views expressed in this Comment, however,
are solely those of the author.
1. See, e.g., REGULATION AND HEALTH FAcrmEs, FLA. DEP'T OF HRS, 3 HEALTHY FLORI-
DL S, THE 1989 FLORIDA STATE HEALTH PLAN 31 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 PLAN]; CENTER FOR
HEALTH PoLIcy RESEARCH, 2 STATE UNIVERSITY STUDY OF INDIGENT CARE 1.18-.19 (1986) [here-
inafter UNIVrEsrrY STUDY]; Koenig, With Surgery Comes Post-Op Pain, FLA. TREND, May 1991,
at 61; Resnick, No Margin, No Mission, FLA. TREND, May 1991, at 65.
2. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 31; Koenig, supra note 1, at 61.
3. Schmid & Faas, Medical Cost Containment: An Empirical Application of Neo-Institu-
tional Economic Theory, in LAW & EcoNoMIcs: AN INsTrrTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 179 (1981);
Gross, Certificate of Need: Background and Review of Recent Changes in Florida's Law, 2 U.
FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 183, 184-186 (1988-1989); Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certifi-
cate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities to State Control, 19 IND. L. REv. 1025, 1025-1033
(1986).
4. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1025. Although CON programs vary somewhat in their spe-
cifics, those differences are not important for this discussion.
5. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 1 ("The major premise underlying the CON Program is
that, in its absence, the marketplace for institutional health services is guided by economic incen-
tives for excess investment."); Gross, supra note 3 at 184; Simpson, supra note 3, at 1028-29.
6. See infra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
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to implement these programs,7 and states began to abandon this regu-
latory approach. 8 Florida, however, still operates a substantial CON
program. 9 It is therefore time to reevaluate Florida's program in light
of its economic soundness and recommend new means to accomplish
its legitimate objectives if, in fact, the current CON program is not
appropriate.
This Comment concludes that Florida should recognize the empiri-
cal evidence and acknowledge that CON does not accomplish its cost
containment goals. That would leave ensuring adequate indigent care
as the only major social objective arguably served by CON.' 0 How-
ever, CON is not a satisfactory tool for solving the indigent care prob-
lem." In fact, some argue that CON actually exacerbates the
problem. 2
By recognizing the flaws in CON and redefining the program and
its goals in light of mounting empirical evidence and a changing health
care environment, Florida could much better achieve CON's objec-
tives at a lower cost to the government. This Comment suggests a new
regulatory scheme that will help accomplish CON's goals by putting
market forces into play while recognizing and compensating for
wealth effects. '3 The proposed scheme compensates for wealth effects
7. H. AARON & W. SchwARTz, THE PAmFL PlEscawTnoN: RATxoN] o HEALTH CARE 5
(1984); Brown, Common Sense Meets Implementation: Certificate-of-Need Regulation in the
States, 8 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 480, 481 (1983).
8. Gross, supra note 3, at 185. There have been a surprisingly small number of reports
about the effects on health care costs in states that abandoned their CON programs. Those states
that abandoned CON shortly after the federal government removed the incentives for these pro-
grams did seem to experience at least a short-term increase in investment and some costs. See
Gross, id. at 192-193; Simpson, supra note 3, at 1080-81. However, some researchers and com-
mentators believe that the changes in the reimbursement environment that have occurred in re-
cent years diminish the predictive value of those states' experiences and that states that abolish
CON in the future will not experience significant increases in capital expenditures. See Shannon,
Certficate of Need: Where it has Been and Where it is Going, MIcH. B.J. 592, 596 (1988) (citing
Burda, Hospital Construction Boom Not Expected Despite End of Some State CON Programs,
MOD. HATncARE 6 (Nov. 6, 1987). Also, this Comment's suggestions for redesigning much of
the environment in which hospitals operate will help prevent other states' negative experiences
from occurring in Florida. See infra notes 144-184 and accompanying text.
9. See Gross, supra note 3, at 185. Florida's certificate of need program is codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 381.701-.7155 (1989 & Supp. 1990) and FLA. AomiN. CODE ANN. chs. 10-5 (1991) & 10-
17 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
10. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1030-32. Other purposes are served by CON, such as protect-
ing the bureaucracy that administers the program and protecting the strong, for-profit interests
in the hospital industry, but whether those are legitimate social objectives is not considered here.
See also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 112-134 and accompanying text.
12. See UNrvEasrr STuy , supra note 1, at 1.2.
13. The economic concept of wealth effects is that an individual may place different values
on the same right, depending on whether the individual must pay someone else to acquire that
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in favor of indigent care providers by giving the providers an entitle-
ment to the initial property rights embodied by CONs and then allow-
ing and encouraging free transfer of the CON property right.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF CON
The CON program as it exists in Florida traces its origins to efforts
at health planning in the early 1970s. 14 CON was said to have three
major goals: controlling health care costs, ensuring quality of care,"5
and ensuring indigent access to medical care. 16 These are basically still
the core goals of the CON program in Florida.7
In 1975, the federal government enacted the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA), providing funding
right or can sell that right in exchange for something.
For example, assume that a factory on a river is given the legal property right to pollute the
river. If a down-river homeowner must purchase the right to require the factory to stop polluting
the river, that homeowner may be willing and able to pay only $5,000. If it would cost the
factory $10,000 to install the technology to stop polluting the river, then the $5,000 offer will not
be sufficient, and the factory will continue to pollute. On the other hand, if the initial legal
property right to be free from river pollution were given to the homeowner, the homeowner
might decide that it is worth $15,000 to keep the river clean and will not sell the right to a clean
river for less than that amount. In this scenario, it is more efficient for the factory to install the
cleaning technology than to purchase the right to pollute the river.
By assigning property rights in a particular way, the government can favor certain social poli-
cies and objectives. In the above hypothetical, if the government wished to favor industry, it
would give the factory the legal right to pollute the river without requiring compensation to
down-river homeowners. If, however, the government favored nonpollution, it would give
down-river homeowners the legal right to compel river clean-ups. In either case, notions of eco-
nomic efficiency and favoring the highest-valuing user require allowing parties to negotiate and
sell their respective property rights. See A. PoLiNsxY, AN INTRODUCTON TO LAW AND EcoNoM-
ICs 136-38 (1989); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
14. Florida's original CON program was enacted in 1972 by ch. 72-391, 1972 Fla. Laws
1364.
15. Although quality of care is listed as a major objective of CON, this Comment does not
discuss that objective in detail. The author believes that the current licensure system, and not
CON, operates fairly effectively to ensure such quality and is not inherently economically
flawed. See FLA. STAT. §§ 395.001-.104 (1989 & Supp. 1990); FLA. ADWI. CODE ANN. ch. 1OD-
28 (1991).
16. See S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1979); Simpson, supra note 3, at 1028-32;
see also Gross, supra note 3, at 189.
17. According to state regulations:
The goal of Florida's Certificate of Need program is to promote the orderly develop-
ment of the healthcare marketplace. The regulatory efforts ... are aimed at:
(1) Fostering the timely development of needed health services and facilities;
(2) Creating a competitive environment for health service development;
(3) Ensuring the development of high quality and cost-effective services; and
(4) Fostering access to underserved groups including Medicaid recipients and indi-
gents.
RoULATON AND HALTH FAcrms, FLA. DEP'T Or HRS, HRS MANUAL, Certificate of Need 1-
2 (February 12, 1990).
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for the CON administrative mechanisms and conditioning certain fed-
eral funds on the enactment of CON review programs.," Florida was
one of twenty states that already had CON programs in place when
the federal requirements were enacted.' 9 Forty-two states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia had CON programs when Congress repealed the re-
quirements in 1986.20 Congress discontinued the CON requirements 2'
because of the Reagan Administration's desire to decrease both fed-
eral funding for and regulation of many government programs and
-because of the mounting empirical evidence that CON cost contain-
ment objectives were not being realized. 22
With the federal CON guidelines lifted, Florida reevaluated its pro-
gram and chose to maintain it, although the legislature did make sev-
eral changes. 23 Some believed that these changes, while arguably not
extremely substantial, would help the program better accomplish its
goals. 24 Such an approach has not been unusual, as many policy mak-
ers have chosen to disregard the analysts who argue that CON is in-
herently flawed, and instead act as if the programs are just poorly
designed .25
18. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975); see also Simpson, supra note 3, at 1042.
19. Gross, supra note 3, at 184-85.
20. Id. at 185; Simpson, supra note 3, at 1025.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3799 (1986).
22. L. BROWN, HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: IssuEs AND OPTIONS 15 (1988);
Simpson, supra note 3, at 1026-27.
23. Gross, supra note 3, at 185; the statutory changes were enacted in ch. 87-92, 1987 Fla.
Laws 355.
Today the Florida statutes basically require that providers first obtain a CON for the follow-
ing projects:
1. Addition of new beds;
2. Construction or establishment of additional health care facilities;
3. Capital expenditures of $1 million or more;
4. Conversion from one type of facility to another;
5. Changes in licensed bed capacity;
6. Establishment of a home health agency or hospice;
7. Acquisitions by health care facilities or health maintenance organizations (HMOs);
8. Establishment of or substantial changes in inpatient institutional health services;
9. Most acquisitions of existing health care facilities;
10. Most acquisitions of major medical equipment by a health care facility or HMO;
11. Project cost overruns;
12. Changes in the number of psychiatric or rehabilitation beds;
13. Establishment of advanced tertiary health services; and
14. Transfer of a CON.
Fx. STAT. § 381.706 (1989).
For a good explanation of the details and procedures of Florida's CON program, see Makar,
Antitrust Immunity Under Florida's Certificate of Need Program, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 149,
150-154 (1991).
24. See Gross, supra note 3, at 210.
25. L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 45.
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II. DEBUNKING THE COST CONTAINMENT MYTH
The primary reason for CON was to help control the rising costs of
health care.26 Regulators believed that market failures" at work in the
health care industry caused hospitals to overinvest in unneeded and
under-used beds and services, thus driving up costs.? While some be-
lieve that this argument has a strong common sense appeal, 29 imple-
menting CON has not helped control costs.30 To understand why, one
must examine the underlying market failures that existed in the hospi-
tal industry during CON's early implementation, changes in today's
marketplace that have acted to counteract some of those failures, and
empirical studies showing the actual results of CON.
A. Underlying Theories
Several market failures have traditionally affected the hospital in-
dustry.3' These market failures aroused public policy concerns because
of the central roles that health care and its spiraling costs have taken
in the political agenda.3 2 The government determined that health care
public policy problems, most notably health care cost containment
and ensuring adequate indigent care, would be best addressed through
CON.33
The underlying market failures and their suitability as bases for reg-
ulation are discussed below. It should be noted that some of these
market failures have been substantially curtailed in recent years be-
26. Gross, supra note 3, at 189; Shannon, supra note 8, at 593. This goal still exists as a
primary motivation for Florida's CON program. Makar, supra note 23, at 149 ("[T]he regula-
tory structure of Florida's certificate of need program has evolved over time but has specifically
retained economic competition as one of its main objectives.").
27. A market failure is some imperfection that causes a market to operate in other than an
economically ideal way, deviating from our notions of how businesses should react to certain
economic conditions. See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15-35 (1982); Feld-
man, Health Insurance in the United States: Is Market Failure Avoidable?, 54 J. RIsK & INs. 298
(1987).
28. Gross, supra note 3, at 184. One of the foundations of this premise was "Roemer's
Law," which argued that physicians will act to fill unused beds, regardless of medical need.
Brown, supra note 7, at 481 (citing M. ROEMER & M. SAiN, HosprrIzAnON UNDER INSuR-
ANcE (1959)).
29. See, e.g., L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 15 ("Since the early 1970s, agreement has been
growing that 'significant surpluses of short-term general hospital beds exist or are developing in
many areas of the United States and that these are contributing significantly to rising hospital
care costs."'); see also Florida Hospitals: A New S&L Crisis, FLA. TREND, March 1991, at 18
[hereinafter Florida Hospitals).
30. See infra notes 102-111 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 35-72 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., supra note 1, and accompanying text.
33. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1037-43.
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cause of significant changes, discussed later, that have occurred in the
health care market. 34
1. Excessive Competition
The traditional notion of excessive competition is that when prices
are set at unprofitably low levels, some firms will be forced out of
business, resulting in higher prices being charged by the remaining
firms.35 The traditional excessive competition argument is similar to
the most widely stated rationale for CON. Proponents of CON claim
that deregulation of hospitals will result in over-investment in un-
needed technology and services, 36 resulting in an inability of many
hospitals to recover their investments because of lack of demand and
the already-slim profit margins of many hospitals. 7 It is argued that
the effect will be overall higher prices as those facilities resort to serv-
ice cross-subsidization in attempts to recover investments. Also,
many hospitals may still be unable to survive economically, 39 which
will result in the failure of certain hospitals. 40 The undesirable effects
of failed hospitals may include decreased access to health care and an
increased ability of some remaining providers to charge even higher
prices because of the resulting decreased competition.
Excessive competition has been discredited as a legitimate rationale
for regulation except when predatory pricing or natural monopoly is a
concern. 4' However, even in those cases, regulation is not the pre-
ferred solution because the antitrust laws sufficiently address the
problem. 42 In the case of hospitals, regulation is not an appropriate
solution for excessive competition, because today's market forces will
ordinarily act as disincentives for economically inefficient behavior. 43
34. See infra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
35. S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 29.
36. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 3, at 184. Florida does have an oversupply of some health
care resources, and these excesses have led to an increase in competition among hospitals. See
UNrvEssrrY STUDY, supra note 1, at 1.8.
37. See L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 15 ("[A] national trend, sharply accentuated in the last
year or two, toward fewer admissions, shorter stays, and lower hospital utilization per 1,000
population has thrust many hospitals into general fiscal stress and unprecedented competition
for patients."); Florida Hospitals, supra note 29, (operating margins for Florida's acute-care
hospitals in 1989 were 0.4%).
38. See Florida Hospitals, supra note 29.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 193-195; R. POSNER, ECONOmC ANALYStS OF LAW 337-
339, 592 (1986).
42. See S. BREaYER, supra note 27, at 159-161.
43. See id. at 195. See also infra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
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2. Moral Hazard
When consumers do not bear the costs of their own behavior or
choices, they have incentives to use more resources and make more
expensive choices than they might if forced to pay for those choices."
This phenomenon is known as the moral hazard problem. 45 When eth-
ical or other institutional pressures do not adequately solve the moral
hazard problem, government regulation may be appropriate.4
The health care industry is traditionally one in which moral hazard
is a significant problem.47 For most people, health care costs are borne
by private insurers or the government, without any limit on the
amount of care that may be purchased or at what cost." For example,
by 1983 only 7.5% of hospital fees were paid directly by the patient.4 9
The remaining 92.5% were paid by the government, third-party insur-
ers, or not at all. 0
The problem of moral hazard in the purchase of health care has
decreased in recent years as those who are the actual economic pur-
chasers of most health care, the private insurance companies and the
government, have begun to intervene in the process and place limits
on the amounts they are willing to spend for certain services and on
the treatment of certain conditions.5' However, the moral hazard
problem still exists to some extent, because even though some third-
party payers are acting to control costs per procedure, patients often
still have limited incentives to reduce the number of procedures they
actually buy. 2 Increased utilization review by third-party payers has
helped to reduce this problem . 3
3. Inadequate Information
The problem of inadequate information arises when consumers can-
not compare and make rational decisions based on comparative attrib-
utes of different alternatives. 4 With health care, this problem often
arises even when full information is made available to the consumer.
44. S. BaEY , supra note 27, at 33.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; FLA. DEP'T oF HRS, 1990 FLORIDA HEALA CA ATLAS 107 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 ALAss.
49. 1990 ATAs, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. See infra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
52. But see infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
53. See 1990 ATLAS supra note 48, at 114, 132; infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
54. S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 26.
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The problem is that the consumer is not able to evaluate the informa-
tion in a way that would allow economically rational decision mak-
ing. 5
The Florida Legislature attempted to solve the cost-of-service inade-
quate information problem through the creation of the Health Care
Cost Containment Board (HCCB).56 One of the duties of HCCB is to
publish cost-of-service information about individual hospitals and
other health care providers."
There are at least two significant problems with this approach to
solving the inadequate information problem. First, the information is
often difficult to interpret, as average costs for some services may be
higher in one hospital while average costs for other services may be
lower in that same hospital. Also, patients are not able to evaluate the
information because often they are not aware of what type of care
they will need and all of the various factors that will determine the
actual cost of that care. 58 The second significant problem is that even
if patients were able to evaluate this information, they would not care
because of the moral hazard problem. 59 However, concern about the
problem of inadequate information as to cost of care is probably de-
creasing because of the increasing involvement of sophisticated insur-
ance companies and other third-party payers, as discussed below.60
When inadequate information actually exists as a market failure,
government regulation may be appropriate. 6' Of course, the regula-
tory remedy must be carefully tailored to address that market fail-
ure.62
4. Inefficient Incentives to Overinvest in Certain Services
Other market failures are not neatly classified into one or more of
the above categories. These failures are largely unique to the health
care industry and are primarily a combination of inadequate informa-
tion and inefficiency in the tort system. The result of these failures is
that hospitals may feel compelled to overinvest in much of the latest
technology-both equipment and services-despite limited economic
need for this technology. 63
55. See Schmid & Faas, supra note 3, at 179.
56. FLA. STAT. § 407.01 (Supp. 1990).
57. FLA. STAT. § 407.09 (1989).
58. Schmid & Faas, supra note 3, at 179.
59. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 75-94 and accompanying text.
61. S. BREYER, supra note 27, at 28.
62. Id.
63. See 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 106.
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Inadequate information seems to be driving patients' desires to be
treated in hospitals with the latest and best technology and proce-
dures, even if those are not the services that the patient actually
needs.64 There are two likely explanations for this. First, there may be
a "halo effect" in the patients' perception of their hospital. 6 For ex-
ample, patients may believe that if a hospital performs organ trans-
plants and has the latest in diagnostic imaging devices, then that
hospital must be that much better and more capable of performing the
routine appendectomy or delivery that the patient actually needs. The
second reason is that the patient may want to have the latest and best
technology, "just in case." In reality, few of those advanced services
are administered on an emergency basis." Thus, if two hospitals are in
close enough proximity to be competitors, the hospitals are also likely
to be close enough for a patient to receive any advanced care needed
on a timely basis, regardless of which hospital the patient initially vis-
its.67
Another failure is seen in the effect the new technology has had on
the medical malpractice system." Many physicians now refuse to per-
form certain services without such advanced technology for fear that
the new technology will be deemed the legally required standard of
care in a subsequent malpractice action. 69
The final unusual market failure is that of institutional ego. This is
comparable to patients wanting to be treated only in hospitals with the
latest and best technology, except that it is the hospital that wants to
be thought of as having that technology and not to be regarded as a
second-class institution.7" While one of the primary reasons for this
overinvestment may be to attract certain patients, another reason for
64. Cf. L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 11 (noting that patients insist on the latest and best
medical resources).
65. See Preston, The Federal Trade Commission's Identification of Implications as Consti-
tuting Deceptive Advertising, 57 U. Cw. L. REv. 1243, 1285-88 (1989).
66. See FLA. ADmaN. CODE ANN. r. 10-5.011 (1990) (access standards for advanced tertiary
services).
67. When regulators try to limit the number of facilities that offer advanced services, there
arises an inherent tension with health care consumers who want easy access to all services,
whether the regulators find a "need" or not. See Comment, Certificate of Need for Health Care
Facilities: A Time for Re-examination, 7 PACE L. Rav. 491, 529 ("While health care regulators
seek to rationalize the health care system, health care consumers want to feel that when family
members fall ill, they will have convenient access to the best and most technologically advanced
medical care.").
68. See Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 985 (1986); Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical
Care, 75 CALEn. L. REv. 1719 (1987).
69. See generally Furrow, supra note 68.
70. L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 11.
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the hospital to accumulate the latest and best technology might be to
attract physicians to the facilities. 7' This is probably a result, at least
in part, of the tort inefficiencies discussed above. 72
B. Today's Hospital Reimbursement Environment Eliminates Many
of These Concerns
When CON review initially gained widespread use during the early
1970s, the health care reimbursement market was significantly differ-
ent than it is today. The intervening changes have had a dramatic im-
pact in eliminating many of the cost containment concerns caused by
the market imperfections discussed above73 and have prompted one
commentator to suggest that "the CON process is superfluous in the
new reimbursement environment." 74
The primary change has come in the way health care is financed.
More than ninety percent of hospital costs today are paid by third
parties such as the government and insurance companies. 7 Thus, any
change in the way those third parties operate may have substantial
effects on the entire hospital market. That is exactly what has hap-
pened. 76 When CON review was implemented nearly twenty years ago,
third-party payment was made primarily using a "reasonable cost"
method. 77 That method allowed providers to receive full reimburse-
ment of their reasonable costs incurred in providing service. 78 The pre-
sumption was that all costs billed were "reasonable," and this meant
that insurance companies paid virtually any bill that the hospitals pre-
pared. 79
Today, however, reimbursement is often made under a prospective
payment method. 80 Under this method, the third-party payer typically
determines in advance how much it will pay for the particular diag-
nosed needs of the patients it covers.8 ' The prospective payment
method encourages providers to develop the most economically effi-
71. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1028-29 n.16.
72. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
73. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1079-80.
74. Shannon, supra note 8, at 595.
75. 1990 ATLAs, supra note 48, at 123 (1987 data).
76. See infra notes 80-97 and accompanying text.
77. Shannon, supra note 8, at 595.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Hamilton, Barriers to Hospital Diversification: The Regulatory Environment, 24 DUQ.
L. REv. 425, 432-434 (1985); Simpson, supra note 3, at 1080. The prospective payment system
was developed by those who finance health care as a response to spiralling costs. See, e.g., 2
UNIVERSITY STUDY, supra note 1, at 1.9.
81. Hamilton, supra note 80, at 432-34.
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cient means to provide those services because the hospital will gener-
ally receive a fixed sum, regardless of actual cost. 82 This system is
regarded as so favorable for cost containment that the Florida Legis-
lature has specifically encouraged it and has even required it in certain
cases. 8 By placing the financial risks of excessive costs on the pro-
vider, hospitals are forced to evaluate more carefully capital expendi-
tures along competitive economic lines, a practice that was not
generally present when CON was initially developed.8 Also, hospitals
are encouraged to reduce actual cost per patient by "discharg[ing] pa-
tients as early as medically possible, . . . identify[ing] and elimi-
nat[ing] the use of unnecessary tests and procedures, and utiliz[ing]
lower cost outpatient services and freestanding facilities to the maxi-
mum extent possible." 85
Because of the expansion of health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), third-party
payers have recently gained even more economic bargaining power
and greater control over the services their member patients receive.
The HMOs and PPOs seek to contain costs by limiting members'
choice of health care providers to those with whom the organization
has negotiated lower rates and by reviewing the members' use of serv-
ices.8 7 The PPOs do not strictly limit members' choice of providers,
but they do offer financial incentives to members to use the preferred
providers. 8 The providers who agree to serve the plans' members do
so for fixed, predetermined rates that usually involve volume dis-
counts. 89 Members are responsible for certain copayment percentages
and deductibles, which are often less for PPO members who use the
services of preferred providersP° Increased activism by third-party
82. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1080.
83. FLA. STAT. § 407.13 (1989).
84. L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 17 ("A tight rein on prospective payment rates and adjust-
ments may ... offer the best of both worlds: a regulatory, price-fixing scheme with strong
competitive implications. Perhaps in time the incentives of the system will encourage mergers,
consolidations, and takeovers, thereby eliminating much of today's surplus capacity."); Shan-
non, supra note 8, at 595.
85. Hamilton, supra note 80, at 433. Some have argued that the effect of such changes is to
decrease quality of care. However, at least some of those who raise the argument may have a
strong self-interest in returning to the reasonable cost method and its higher reimbursement
rates. See Gross, supra note 3, at 195 n.90 (information in article taken from a letter written by
the executive vice president of the Arizona nursing home industry).
86. Simpson, supra note 3, at 1080.
87. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 132.
88. Id. at 134.
89. Id. at 132.
90. Id. at 134.
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payers helps to control costs by forcing providers to act in an econom-
ically efficient manner. 9'
In addition to negotiating for lower fees, HMOs, PPOs, and other
third-party payers intervene to control the actual usage of health care
service by the patients they cover. 92 Such intervention typically in-
volves requiring preapproval of nonemergency care and after-the-fact
review of services provided in order to determine the necessity and
propriety of such services. 93 This process of reviewing patient use al-
lows for the denial of payment for medical care that is deemed unnec-
essary. 94
The increasing use of copayments and deductibles in ordinary
health insurance has also acted to decrease the moral hazard prob-
lem. 95 Insurers have adopted copayments and deductibles in response
to the substantial economic literature that shows the moral hazard ef-
fect when near-100% insurance is available.96 The more that patients
have to pay when they receive care, the more likely they will be to
examine more carefully whether such care is actually necessary. 97
Another change in today's health care environment is not directly
related to reimbursement methods, but has still had an impact on how
hospitals have been forced to compete. 9 The increasing development
of ambulatory surgical centers and other outpatient facilities has given
hospitals competition where previously there was none. 99 Such compe-
tition is even more pronounced because due to the considerable sav-
ings that are usually involved, some third-party payers require that
certain services be provided on an outpatient basis.100 That outpatient
facilities are generally exempt from CON requirements has undoubt-
edly also played a role in their development and competitiveness. 0
C. Empirical Literature Showing CON's Ineffectiveness at Cost
Containment
Given the tenuous economic grounds upon which CON was initially
established and the subsequent changes in the way the hospital indus-
91. See id. at 132.
92. Id.
93. L. BROWN, POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION, HMOs As FEDERAL POLICY 174
(1983).
94. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 132.
95. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 13, at 56-57.
96. See, e.g., id.
97. See id.
98. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 114; L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 18.
99. See 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 114; L. BROWN, supra note 22, at 18.
100. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 114; Hamilton, supra note 80, at 433. Also, some insurers
provide strong economic incentives for their insureds to use outpatient services. For example, an
insurer may pay 100% of the cost of an outpatient procedure, but will require a 20% copayment
if the service is performed on an inpatient basis.
101. See FLA. STAT. § 381.706(1)(c) (1989).
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try has been forced to operate, it comes as little surprise that CON
may not be accomplishing its primary goal of cost containment. An
in-depth, statistically valid study is not required to recognize that hos-
pital costs have continued to spiral since the early days of CON.? 2
The question is whether CON has had a moderating effect on this
trend, and research shows that it has not. 03
One survey of the empirical literature on CON and cost contain-
ment has found that "[r]esearch on this form of hospital regulation
has produced remarkably consistent results. The empirical evidence
indicates that certificate-of-need laws have not been successful in re-
straining per diem, per case, or per capita hospital costs."'14 In one
comparison of health care prices and expenses, it was shown that such
prices and expenses are actually higher in areas with CON regulations
than they are in areas without CON." 5 Also, some researchers believe
that the primary effects of CON laws are less efficient resource use
and higher costs. °6
Despite the strong support it enjoyed at its inception and still en-
joys in some circles in Florida, 0 7 CON "has elicited a remarkable
evaluative consensus-that it does not work."""1° In fact, to the ex-
tent that cost containment remains a regulatory goal, it seems that
CON is not the means to achieve that goal.10 9 Rather, changes in
the economic environment in which hospitals operate seem to be
the best means of accomplishing the goal of cost containment. A
letter from the staff of the Federal Trade Commission stated that
102. In fact, national expenditures for hospital care have climbed from $52.4 billion in 1975
when the federal government enacted NHPRDA to an estimated $230.1 billion in 1989. 1990
ATLAS, supra note 48, at 109.
103. At least one commentator suggests that the results of these studies may be unreliable
because of "inherent methodological flaws." Gross, supra note 3, at 191. However, Mr. Gross
was apparently unable to provide contradictory evidence to show that CON programs do contain
costs.
104. Steinwald & Sloan, Regulatory Approaches to Hospital Cost Containment: A Synthesis
of the Empirical Evidence, in A NEw APPROACH TO THE EcONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 274, 285
(1981).
105. Shannon, supra note 8, at 593 (citing M. NOETHER, COMPETITION AMONG HosPrTALS
(1987) (Federal Trade Commission Staff Report)).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 3.
108. Brown, supra note 7, at 481.
109. Coase argued that government decision making is often an inappropriate means of allo-
cating resources that are subject to market forces. The reason is twofold:
First of all [the government] lacks the precise monetary measure of benefit and cost
provided by the market. Second, it cannot, by the nature of things, be in possession of
all the relevant information possessed by the managers of every [relevant] business
... to say nothing of the preferences of consumers for the various goods and services
[in question].
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 18 (1959).
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[o]ngoing improvements in health care financing are resolving the
principal problems that prompted CON regulation. Moreover, the
benefits of CON regulation, if any, are likely to be outweighed by its
adverse effects on competition in health care markets. Consequently,
CON regulation is likely to harm consumers on balance by increasing
the price of health care services . .o
Overall, "[tihe current evidence ...suggests that certificate-of-need
controls ... may be regarded as a classic example of regulatory fail-
ure."'
III. INDIGENT CARE
The concepts of CON, cost containment, and indigent care are in-
terrelated. In addition to cost containment, one of the stated goals of
CON is ensuring adequate care to Florida's indigent population. 112
Nonetheless, a report commissioned and conducted by the state found
that its cost containment approaches are actually contributing to the
state's indigent care problem." 3 Because of the increasing indigent
care burden on Florida's hospitals," 4 it is necessary to examine the
current system for the provision and financing of such care to deter-
mine whether it is adequate. If not, the system should be changed.
A. The Current System
In Florida there are essentially two parts to the current system of
indigent care. The first part comes in determining to whom CONs will
be awarded; facilities that provide large amounts of indigent care are
favored. The second part involves a system of taxes and fees that are
redistributed to indigent care providers as partial compensation for
care that would otherwise go uncompensated.
One of the review criteria established by the Florida Legislature for
the award of CONs is "[tihe applicant's past and proposed provision
110. Shannon, supra note 8, at 596 (quoting a letter from John J. Mendenhall to Michigan
Representative Gerald H. Law (March 7, 1988)).
111. Steinwald & Sloan, supra note 104, at 296.
112. See Simpson, supra note 3, at 1083-84.
Indigent patients are generally defined as those "whose ability to pay for health care is limited
by poverty, lack of insurance, or a catastrophic illness." 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 138.
113. UNVERsrrIy STuDY, supra note 1, at 1.2.
This result may be argued as being atypical based on the argument that "[regulation is often
beneficial to the regulated firms." McCormick, The Strategic Use of Regulation: A Review of
the Literature, in TBE PoLITIcAL EcoNoMy OF REGULATION: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN THE REGULA-
TORY PROCESS 13, 18 (Federal Trade Commission Law & Economics Conference 1984).
114. 1989 PLA, supra note 1, at 31.
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of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indi-
gent."'1 l Additionally, preference in CON awards is to be given to
those applicants who "ensure access to emergency and other health
care services for all Floridians without regard to their economic status
... [and] [providers who serve a disproportionate number of charity
and Medicaid patients and who propose to provide services in under-
served areas or to specific populations in need." 1 1 6 Presumably, these
preferences require Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (HRS) to weight the balance in favor of the indigent care pro-
vider." 7 Because no indication is given by the Legislature or in the
administrative rules, however, it is unclear exactly how much weight is
to be given to this or any other single factor."'
The advantage of preference in the CON awards for Florida's indi-
gent care providers (ICPs) is that it allows the ICPs to offer certain
sophisticated services without competition that may otherwise exist
from nonICPs. The lack of competition draws many of the paying
patients to the ICPs, helping those providers cross-subsidize their indi-
gent care services." 9 This wealth-transferring policy has rich sick peo-
ple paying to care for poor sick people. Such cost-shifting has become
more difficult in recent years as third-party payers have reformed
their systems of reimbursement and have refused to participate in fi-
nancing care for patients other than their own. 20
If the more "glamorous" nonICPs are permitted to add new serv-
ices and technology, those nonICPs may skim the cream from the in-
digent providers. 2' That is, the patients who can pay, once given a
choice, may use the upper-scale nonICPs, leaving the ICPs with only
the indigents and hence, an insufficient number of paying patients to
allow for overall profitability. The lack of profitability may lead to
the failure of ICPs and leave a significant portion of the population
without ready access to health care. While cream skimming is usually
115. FIA. STAT. § 381.705(l)(n) (1989).
116. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 4.
117. The Office of Community Health Services and Facilities within HRS is responsible for
reviewing and analyzing CON applications and for issuing and denying CONs. FLA. ADmIN.
CODE ANN. r. 10-5.003 (1991).
118. See Collier Medical Center v. Department of HRS, 462 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1st DCA
1985) ("[T]he appropriate weight to be given to each individual criterion is not fixed, but rather
must vary on a case-by-case basis, depending upon the facts of each case.").
119. See Makar, supra note 23, at 155; Ponsoldt, Immunity Doctrine, Efficiency Promotion,
and the Applicability of Federal Antitrust Law to State-Approved Hospital Acquisitions, 12 J.
CORP. L. 37, 40 (1986).
120. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 31; UNIVERsYrr STUDY, supra note 1, at 1.2.
121. See Ponsoldt, supra note 119, at 40. See generally A. KAN, THE EcoNohacs OF REGU-
LATION: PRINCPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 220-246 (1971).
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economically efficient, it may result in undesirable effects on social
welfare, as here.' 22
The second major element of Florida's policy for the provision of
indigent care is based on an assessment paid into the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund (PMATF).' 2 The PMATF was originally estab-
lished in 1984 under the Health Care Access Act'2 to reimburse hospi-
tals for uncompensated care. 125 The PMATF is funded through a 1.5
percent surcharge on all hospital revenues,'2 and the state has also
contributed a total of $30 million from its general fund since the
PMATF was created.' 27 The fund is administered by the Medicaid
program and is therefore eligible for matching federal funds. 12 The
PMATF has allowed indigent care providers to receive considerably
more revenue than they would have otherwise, but it is facing increas-
ing operating deficits. 29 For fiscal year 1990-91, the estimated deficit
was $219 million. 30
Operating deficits prompted attempts during the 1991 Legislative
Session by the Governor and members of the Legislature to increase
the assessment that it charges hospitals, 3' but no legislation was actu-
ally passed. 32 Currently all hospitals are subject to an assessment of
122. See A. KAHN, supra note 121, at 220-246.
123. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 138.
124. 1984 Fla. Laws 52; 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 138.
125. 1990 ATLAS, supra note 48, at 138. In the intent portion of the statute that established
the PMATF, the Legislature said:
It is declared that access to adequate health care is a right which should be available to
all Floridians. However, rapidly increasing health care costs threaten to make such
care unaffordable for many citizens. The Legislature finds that unreimbursed health
care services provided to persons who are unable to pay for such services cause the
cost of services to paying patients to increase in a manner unrelated to the actual cost
of services delivered. Further, the Legislature finds that inequities between hospitals in
the provision of unreimbursed services prevent hospitals that provide the bulk of such
services from competing on an equitable economic basis with hospitals that provide
relatively little care to indigent persons. Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to
provide a method for the [sic] funding the provision of health care services to indigent
persons, the cost of which should be borne by the state and by the hospitals that are
granted the privilege of operating in this state.
Ch. 282, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2165 (West) (renumbering and amending FLA. STAT.
§ 409.918 (1989)).
126. FLA. STAT. § 395.101 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
127. Ch. 91-282, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2165 (West) (renumbering and amending FLA.
STAT. § 409.918 (1989)).
128. 1990 ATLAs, supra note 48, at 138.
129. Id.
130. Id. Faced with this information, the 1991 Legislature could have adopted a long-term
strategy for dealing with the indigent care problem, but it declined to do so.
131. See Tallahassee Democrat, Apr. 22, 1991, at IA, col. 1; Tallahassee Democrat, April
22, 1991, at IC, col. 4.
132. The Legislature did extend the 1.5%70 assessment to other types of health care entities for
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1.5 percent of revenues.133 Schemes suggested by the Governor and the
Legislature would have had hospitals pay as much as 3.5 percent of
their revenues into the PMATF.13 That our government leaders be-
lieve that such an increase in assessments may be necessary tends to
indicate that there are fundamental problems with the system of fi-
nancing indigent care in Florida.
B. Recommendations
The fundamental problems in managing the escalating indigent care
problem 35 in the current regulatory environment are that health care
is expensive, and the current system allows only three inadequate al-
ternatives for financing indigent care. The first alternative is to force
hospitals to absorb the costs of providing indigent care and pass those
costs on to paying patients. 3 6 As has been discussed, though, the ma-
jor third-party payers have gotten more involved in the process and
have refused to participate in such cross-subsidization. 137 The second
alternative is direct governmental support of ICPs through a system
of taxation. However, a plan increasing the burden on taxpayers is
destined to fail in Florida, given the state's limited tax base under the
current system of taxation. 3 The third alternative is to charge all hos-
pitals a fee to be paid into a fund such as the PMATF and to use the
proceeds to subsidize indigent care. 39 As has been seen with the
PMATF, the assessment would have to be a significant percentage of
hospitals' operating revenues. Otherwise, such a fund would not be
sufficient to accomplish its goals. 40 There is doubt about whether the
hospital industry is financially healthy enough to afford such in-
creased assessments.141
Because of the lack of satisfactory alternatives that the current reg-
ulatory environment allows, it is appropriate to redefine the regula-
tory environment to allow for new approaches to financing indigent
care in Florida.' 42 This Comment proposes that the goal of financing
contribution to the PMATF. Ch. 91-112, 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 903 (West) (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. § 395.1015).
133. See Tallahassee Democrat, supra note 131, at IC, col 4; FLA. STAT. § 395.101 (1989).
134. See Tallahassee Democrat, supra note 131, at IC, col 4.
135. 1990 ATLAs, supra note 48, at 138 (indigent care is called "[a] growing crisis").
136. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Comment, The Taxation and Budget Reform Commission: Florida's Best
Hopefor the Future, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. Ray. 437 (1991).
139. See supra notes 123-130 and accompanying text.
140. 1990 ATLAs, supra note 48, at 138-39.
141. See Florida Hospitals, supra note 29.
142. Using regulation to help correct for various market failures is based on a public interest
model of regulation. See McCormick, supra note 113, at 17.
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indigent care can be accomplished best by redefining the regulatory
environment in such a way that market forces will determine how to
pay for such care. The redefined system will also address the two
other major goals of the current CON program-cost containment
and quality control-at least as well as the current system does.
The suggestions made below to encourage cooperative agreements
among health care providers and between providers and third-party
payers should help further eliminate the market failures at work in the
hospital industry and allow for greater cost containment. When the
suggestions below are combined with the increased power of third-
party payers, hospital costs should be contained to an economically
efficient level. Quality control will still be guaranteed because the sys-
tem of licensure and inspection by HRS will be continued in its cur-
rent form. 143
1. Redefine the Notion of CON
There are several elements to the proposed plan for restructuring
the regulatory environment. First, the process and the purpose 44 of
CON must be redefined. 45 Under the new system, a provider would
still have to have a CON before it could establish new services,' 46 but
the process of issuing CONs and determining who receives them
would be changed. The initial property right for any CON would be
given to the ICPs147 in the affected service area.' 4 The ICPs would
then have several options.
143. See FLA. STAT. §§ 395.001-.104 (1989 & Supp. 1990); FLA. ADMN. CODE CH. IOD-28
(1986).
144. The new system requires us to reevaluate the goals of CON. Because the cost of health
care is not favorably affected by the CON program, the redefined program would concentrate
on financing indigent care more efficiently. Other structural changes in the nonCON regulatory
environment will address some of the other traditional concerns of CON, including cost contain-
ment.
145. Some of the elements of this proposal are suggested by Coase, supra note 109, in his
discussion of the Federal Communications Commission.
146. Beds can be removed from CON limitations because of recommendations concerning
the deregulation of beds. See infra notes 168-184 and accompanying text.
147. Designation as an ICP would need to be defined based on past levels of indigent care
and conditioned on future provision of care at or above those levels.
Obviously, the details proposed in this overall framework may need to be modified depending
on the precise nature of the individual competitive market and the number of indigent care prov-
iders in a service area. This will be particularly important because the state's indigent care popu-
lation tends to be concentrated in certain geographic areas. See UNVEnsrrv STUDY, supra note 1,
at 1.15. However, the purpose of this Comment is not to draft precise legislation but to recom-
mend a new framework for consideration by the Legislature.
148. The mere giving of this valuable property right without charge naturally raises the in-
come of the ICP above what it would otherwise be. See Coase, supra note 109, at 22.
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If an ICP determined that the greatest economic value of the CON
would result from operating the service authorized, then the ICP
could choose to exercise its CON. The decision would be based on
ordinary economic considerations such as demand for the service,
ability to attract paying patients, competitive environment, comple-
mentary services already existing at the facility or nearby facilities,
and costs of operation, including necessary changes to the existing
plant and staffing. 149
If the ICP determined that the greatest economic value of the CON
lay in the price that other nonICPs were willing and able to pay for
the CON property right, then the ICP could sell the CON to the high-
est bidder.150 The CONs under this new system would, of course, be
freely transferable by any holder." The nonICP would make its deci-
sions about the extent to which it valued the property right embodied
in the CON by considering essentially the same factors as would the
ICP."12
There are two major advantages to this redefined system of CON.
First, the free transferability will allow the property right to arrive in
the hands of the highest-valuing user, a fundamental concept of eco-
nomic efficiency.' By giving the initial property right to the ICPs,
the balance of economic rights is weighted in favor of the ICPs and
the state can favor the ICPs by compensating for wealth effects 5 4
without violating sound economic principles. 5 The second major ad-
vantage is that the ICP is given the flexibility to determine how best to
use the resources available to it. 156 If the ICP determines that sur-
rounding economic conditions indicate that operation of the service
149. Of course, any provider would still have to meet applicable quality and licensure stan-
dards. This would alleviate the concern of those who believe that CON is still important for its
role in ensuring quality of care. See Simpson, supra note 3, at 1082-83.
150. The possible value of the CON would be further increased because of the recommended
policy of encouraging combinations and cooperative agreements discussed below. See infra notes
157-164 and accompanying text.
151. The current CONs are transferrable with permission of HRS, but making a profit on
such transfer is a criminal offense punishable by fine and imprisonment. FLA. STAT. § 381.712
(1989). Obviously, no such limitation would be present under the proposed scheme.
152. It is important to note that nonICPs that operate a service not provided by a reasonably
accessible ICP will have to provide a certain amount of indigent care. This factor must be con-
sidered by the nonICP in determining the extent to which it values the property right embodied
in the CON.
153. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 109.
154. See supra note 13; A. POLNSKY, supra note 13, at 136.
155. Of course, it is possible that the CON will not always be put to its most efficient use
because of transaction costs. Coase, supra note 109, at 27 n.54.
156. See Makar, supra note 23, at 157 ("Despite the efforts of health-planning agencies to
predict and provide guidance on future health care trends, reliance on market forces provides
greater flexibility in adapting to fluctuating market conditions.").
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authorized by the CON would allow for the greatest profitability and
possibilities for cross-subsidization, then the ICP can choose to take
that route. If, on the other hand, the greatest value of the CON to the
ICP is the price that other facilities are willing to pay to purchase the
CON, then the ICP can sell the CON and use the profits from the sale
to finance other services it provides to indigent patients.
2. Encourage Cooperative Agreements Among Hospitals and
Between Hospitals and Private Payers
One of the market failures at work in the current system is the per-
ceived potential for excessive competition.' 7 Along with some of the
other market imperfections, including the inefficient incentives to
overspend for certain services,"18 this failure leads to a recommenda-
tion that the government encourage combinations and cooperative
agreements among health care providers." 9 Currently, many hospitals
view themselves as needing to be full service hospitals offering all ma-
jor services and having sufficient resources to support that arrange-
ment, even though there may be another hospital nearby that offers
exactly the same services.1l 0 This view results in a large amount of
wasteful redundancy.' 6' A solution, therefore, would be to allow hos-
pitals to jointly operate certain services for which there is not enough
actual demand to support multiple services, but for which the market
imperfections demand that each hospital have ready access. 62 Fears
that these hospitals may engage in monopoly pricing are addressed by
the increasing intervention and market power of third-party payers
who could effectively prevent excessive price gouging.
Encouraging joint operations will also allow for greater effective-
ness of the proposal to give ICPs the initial property rights in CONs
and allow them to freely transfer those rights to the highest-valuing
user. By encouraging combinations, the value placed on certain serv-
ices may be increased. For example, an ICP may determine that it
values a particular CON highly, but not highly enough to warrant ex-
ercising it by itself, and there may be other nonICPs who place similar
values on the CON. By allowing the ICP to operate services jointly
157. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
159. Such encouragement may require providing certain exemptions from antitrust laws.
160. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
162. See Hamilton, supra note 80 for the argument that one of the major flaws of CON is
that it acts as a barrier to such efficiency-increasing arrangements.
Such cooperative agreements are already being used to some extent. For example, mobile lith-
otripters are being shared by several facilities in Florida.
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with other facilities, or by allowing it to sell the CON to a group of
other facilities, the overall value placed on the right will be maxi-
mized. Maximizing the CON value allows the total value to society to
be maximized and also ensures that the ICPs receive the greatest sub-
sidies.
Another important benefit of encouraging these arrangements is
that combinations between urban ICPs and suburban nonlCPs will
allow for more direct cross-subsidization of the uncompensated care
provided by the urban ICPs. Because much of Florida's indigent pop-
ulation is located in urban areas, some of Florida's inner-city hospi-
tals provide a disproportionate amount of indigent care. 63 Some of
these inner-city hospitals believe it is necessary to establish satellite fa-
cilities in suburban areas "to attract paying patients and subsidize
charity care costs."''  Cooperative agreements between both types of
facilities would give suburban nonlCPs access to services for which
the ICP was issued the CON property right, and they would give in-
ner-city ICPs access to pre-existing suburban revenue-generating facil-
ities. These transactions presumably could be accomplished at a lower
cost than would be required for the nonlCPs to purchase the CON
from the ICP or for the ICP to build or purchase a satellite facility.
Also, relationships should be encouraged between health care provi-
ders and third-party payers who actually finance the care. 65 Encour-
aging more active relationships between the hospitals and the third-
party payers should further decrease the moral hazard problem. The
institutional participants, in conjunction with the third-party payers,
will work to eliminate incentives and opportunities for patients to
choose their health care in an economically irresponsible manner. An
active relationship between the hospitals and the third-party payers
will also increase incentives for efficiency.166 By placing a strong fi-
163. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 26.
164. Id.
165. Previously there was a legislative exemption from the CON regulations for hospitals
controlled by HMOs. FLA. STAT. § 381.713(1) (1989). The Legislature removed the exemption
for HMOs in the 1991 legislative session. Ch. 91-282, 1991 Fla. Laws 2610. Skeptics charge that
the Legislature removed the exemption in response to lobbying by competitors of Florida's larg-
est HMO, Humana, and also in response to HRS's institutional objectives of protecting existing
providers and protecting the power of the agency. See 1990 Ars.As, supra note 48, at 134. This
type of turf protection by an agency is not unusual in light of bureaucratic models claiming that
regulation proceeds to maximize the size of the bureaucracy. See McCormick, supra note 113, at
20 n.19.
166. L. BRowN, supra note 22, at 45-46: "[Alccessible care of acceptable quality can be
harmonized with the containment of costs in any system with extensive third-party payment only
if payers (public, private, or both) build stable negotiating structures with providers."
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nancial emphasis on the provision of health care, costs eventually will
be lowered and economic efficiency eventually will be improved. 67
3. Deregulate Beds
Because of the huge surplus of hospital beds already existing in
Florida, hospital beds must be treated differently than services. While
the scheme proposed in this Comment would still regulate entry into
new service areas, no such barriers should exist for the addition, re-
moval, or conversion of hospital beds.
There are several reasons for this huge surplus of beds. First, as
third-party payers have implemented prospective payment mechan-
isms, the number of admissions and the average length of stay have
decreased.'6 The surplus may be further evidence of the far-reaching
impact that the increasing intervention of the government and of pri-
vate insurers is having. Another major reason for the decreased use of
inpatient hospital beds 69 is the increased use of outpatient facilities. 70
The increased use of outpatient facilities is expected to continue as
technological advances allow more procedures to be performed on an
outpatient basis.' 7' It is significant from the third-party payers' per-
spective that the outpatient treatment alternative is generally less ex-
pensive than inpatient care, and it is significant from the hospitals'
perspective that Florida does not require a CON to establish outpa-
tient facilities.
The health planners at HRS have determined that the optimum de-
sirable occupancy rate for acute care hospital beds is seventy-five per-
cent. 72 A recent report by HRS showed the actual statewide
occupancy average to be 52.7%,' 73 resulting in an excess of 15,722
beds.174 The fixed and operating expenses associated with these excess
beds result in an estimated annual cost of between $64.6 million and
$1.6 billion, depending on the study used. 75 Based on this tremendous
excess and forecasts for future usage, "bed need projections have
been zero for several years,' ' 7 6 and it is estimated that if no more beds
167. Continued licensure standards and the constant supervision of the medical malpractice
system will ensure that quality of care is not sacrificed in the name of economic savings.
168. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 20.
169. General care inpatient hospital beds are usually known as acute care beds. FLA. ADMN.
CODE ANN. r. 10-5.002(2) (1991).
170. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 22.
171. Id.
172. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 10-5.038(e) (1991); 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 16.
173. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 20.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 16.
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are added to the system, Florida will not reach the seventy-five per-
cent occupancy standard until after the year 2010. 71 These unused as-
sets are cited by some as one of the primary reasons for the financial
difficulties of many hospitals. 7 8
Hospital beds should be deregulated, and hospitals should be al-
lowed to add, remove, and change the status of beds as the market
dictates. This will allow hospitals to use existing beds for more than
just the narrow uses that the law currently allows. 79 Currently, if a
hospital has 100 beds licensed for acute care patients and half of those
beds remain unused, there are no real alternative uses to which the
hospital can put those beds.'80 Also, if that hospital determines that
the space and resources demanded by those unused beds would be put
to better use in some other way, it must apply for a CON to delicense
those beds.' Thus, there is considerable waste, and some hospitals
cite this factor as a major one in their decreasing profits. 8 2
The deregulation proposed will allow the hospitals to vary bed us-
age depending on how the needs of a community differ over time and
what the market demands. For example, the hospital described above
could-if it had adequately trained personnel-use some of those fifty
unused beds for demanded income-generating psychiatric, substance
abuse, or rehabilitation services. 83 Giving the hospitals the authority
to make those determinations and to add or remove beds as appropri-
ate will increase long-term efficiency.
The resulting increased efficiency from deregulating the use of hos-
pital beds will help finance indigent care in two ways. First, it will
directly benefit ICPs by allowing them to use all their resources in the
most economically efficient way. Second, it will allow nonICPs to op-
erate more efficiently and increase overall profitability. '4 Both events
will place nonICPs in stronger financial positions and therefore in-
crease the amounts they are able to offer to purchase the property
rights to CONs from the ICPs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The CON program, as initially conceived and currently imple-
mented, has a primary goal of containing health care costs and a sec-
177. Id. at 23.
178. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; Florida Hospitals, supra note 29.
179. HRS has said that hospitals should be encouraged to use excess beds for alternative
purposes, but under that proposal HRS would still have to license and authorize those alterna-
tive purposes. 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 25.
180. See FLA. STAT. § 381.706(l)(a), (e) (1991).
181. FLA. STAT. § 381.706(l)(e) (1991).
182. See Florida Hospitals, supra note 29.
183. See 1989 PLAN, supra note 1, at 25.
184. Id.
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ondary goal of ensuring adequate indigent care. The first goal is not
achieved, and the second goal is not efficiently or adequately
achieved.
The economic environment for hospitals has changed dramatically
since the early years of CON, and the empirical literature is virtually
unanimous in its findings that CON has been ineffective at controlling
costs. In light of these developments the federal government and sev-
eral states have abandoned their CON programs, yet Florida has nei-
ther abandoned its program nor made meaningful substantial
changes. It is time for Florida to abandon its CON program as a tool
for cost containment. There is no real evidence that it is effective, and
there is ample evidence that it is actually exacerbating the problems of
the hospital marketplace.
The CON program may have some usefulness as a tool for ensuring
adequate indigent care through protection of indigent care providers.
The significant financial woes of the system designed to finance indi-
gent care indicate, however, that CON is not accomplishing that goal.
The CON program should be redefined to better accomplish the social
goal of financing indigent care. By giving indigent care providers the
property rights to exercise or sell CONs, and by allowing continued
free transfer of CONs, market forces will help determine how best to
provide compensation for the ICPs. This fundamental change, com-
bined with other steps to make the hospital industry more efficient as
a whole, will strengthen the system of indigent care in Florida, and
will, as a pleasant side effect, strengthen the entire hospital market in
the long run.
